. . . continued
Note: Given the enthusiastic response, the current series will remain in place for another week. To begin, please see Part One below, currently archived under “Military”.
Of further note, recent reports claim that, following the attempted assassination of its Ambassador in Washington, the government of Saudi Arabia has requested the government of the USA to destroy militarily Iranian nuclear facilities. Will the current occupant of the Oval Office oblige? Unlikely, unless his advisors, sensing an overwhelming probability of losing the upcoming presidential election, counsel him to display “strength and resolve” by doing so; “wagging the dog”. More likely, they will counsel him to rely on the Republicans’ incredible aptitude for ineptitude . . . think candidates Robert Dole and John McCain . . . to carry him to electoral victory.
Even should Mr. Obama oblige the Saudis, would defanging Iran bolster the Israeli cause? Would it transform Saudi enemies into newfound friends? Would it cause other Mohammedan Arabs to follow a path to peace?
Ironically, Americans’ removing the nuclear threat from Iran without wringing from the Saudis prior concessions in favor of Israel probably would embolden the Arabic enemies of Israel to press forward their strategy of isolating and strangling the Jewish State. Would Mr. Obama demand such concessions? Before answering, recall him bowing to the King of Saudi Arabia.
Whatever a plan, one should monitor whether its consequences are progressing towards fulfilling its targeted goal. In resolving problematic situations, measurement of progress is critical but, unfortunately, often neglected. Given the Middle Eastern situation-in-question, how could the Israelis measure progress?
Measurement comes in two forms; namely, qualitative and quantitative. The latter is preferable but not always practicable. Especially should Israel adopt Plan #5, there would be several axes for measurement, including military, political, economic, and social; some more amenable to quantitative measurement than others.
Militarily, measurement easily is quantifiable. To what extent, for example, would Israel have captured the territories targeted? To what extent would Israel have pacified those territories measures by numbers of hostile incidents, deaths, and injuries? To what extent would Israel have blunted the efforts of its other military enemies in terms of amounts of military expenditures as well as numbers of threatening actions and threatening rhetoric?
Politically and nationally, measurement tends towards the qualitative. Primarily, would the Jewish proclivity for internecine arguing seem to be damaging the military effort? Most nations recognize that, during a declared war, the government has the right, if not the obligation, to limit speech that might undermine its military effort. Accordingly, the Israeli government could declare a state of emergency and limit civil rights during active fighting and immediately thereafter. A question arises, however . . . Would Israelis accept surrender of internecine arguing in the short term in favor of victory over a mortal enemy in the long term?
Politically and internationally, measurement can be quantitative. How many other countries would have severed diplomatic ties with Israel or even have mounted an active campaign to isolate Israel further? As an aside, should Israel capture the Saudi oilfields, one wonders how long-lived such overt hostility would be? Money is a powerful contingent consequence; money moves the world.
Economically, measurement is mainly quantitative. In shekels, how much would the option chosen be affecting the Gross Domestic Product, balance of payments, and trading balance? What would be the trend?
Socially and nationally, measurement is largely qualitative. To what extent would the Israeli population seem to be bonding? To what extent, would Israelis seem to be supporting their own troops during a prolonged occupation? In that regard, the Israelis might consider borrowing a page from British history with an emphasis on positive control of the enemy (www.inescapableconsequences.com).
Socially and internationally, measurement, on the other hand, can be quantitative. How many other countries would be barring entry by Israeli citizens? How many foreigners would be boycotting Israel as a traveling destination? How many exchanges between foreigners and Israelis would be curtailed? In the context of Israeli control of the oilfields, On the other hand, again one wonders how long-lived such overt hostility likely would be? As previously stated, money is a powerful contingent consequence; money moves the world.
Science and Resolution
This series addressing the plight of Israel presented a scientifically-compatible approach to solving societal problems . . . an approach equally applicable to personal ones. Firstly, analyze the situation-in-question in terms of Context then Antecedents-Behaviors-Consequences . . . the ABC’s. Secondly, resolve the situation-in-question by Defining the Problem, Targeting a Goal, Designing a Plan, and Measuring Progress.
Final Comments About Israel
Jewish Israel is losing. Mohammedan Arabia is winning.
Must Israel adopt a new strategy? Need Arabia only maintain the old one?
To win the peace, must Israel give war a chance? Must Israel strike soon while the proverbial iron remains hot?
Conversely, what can Israel gain by waiting? Further isolation? Withdrawal of American support? A nuclear-armed Iran? Do such developments sound enticing?
There’s an American flag dating from 1775 that reads, “Don’t Tread On Me.” Might it be a warning that the Israelis should consider borrowing? Might it be one that Americans themselves should consider resurrecting?